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The Torture Debate
Tortured Responses (A Reply to Our
Critics): Physically Persuading Suspects
Is Morally Preferable to Allowing the
Innocent to Be Murdered
By MiRKo BAGARIC* & JULIE CLARKE"
IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO STATE that our first article on tor-
ture-"Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances
in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable"1 in Volume 39 of this Law
Review provoked a furious debate. This was initially sparked by an
opinion piece published in a Melbourne newspaper 2 that summarized
the main arguments in the article. Responses and commentaries on
the issues flooded in not only from academics but from large numbers
of lay people and politicians past and present-including a former
Australian Prime Minister.
Because there have been dozens of critical responses to our arti-
cle, it is not feasible to respond to them all. In this Article we focus on
the most persuasive and pervasive criticisms that have been leveled
against our position. Since some readers will not have the opportunity
to read either our first article or the responses, a summary of the de-
bate is in order.
The proposal in our original article is straightforward. Torture is
morally permissible where it is the only means available to save inno-
cent lives.3 Torture should only be used when (1) the threat is immi-
nent, (2) there are no other means of alleviating the threat, and (3)
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** Lecturer, Deakin Law School.
1. See Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Cir-
cumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 581 (2005).
2. See generally Mirko Bagaric, A Case for Torture, AGE (Melbourne), May 17, 2005, at
13.
3. See Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 585.
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the suspect is known to have the relevant information. Torture is justi-
fiable in these circumstances because it is a lesser evil to inflict physi-
cal harm on a person than to allow large numbers of people, or even a
single person, to die. When rights clash and only one right can be
protected we should opt for the higher order right. To this end, the
right to life is more important than the right to physical integrity.4
We used the following example as a situation in which torture
would be justified: A terrorist network has activated a large bomb on
one of hundreds of commercial planes carrying over three hundred
passengers that is flying somewhere in the world at this instant. Via a
statement on the Internet, the leader of the terrorist organization an-
nounces that the bomb is set to explode in thirty minutes. Further, he
states that the bomb was planted by one of his colleagues at one of the
major airports in the world in the past few hours. No details are pro-
vided regarding the location of the plane where the bomb is located.
Unbeknownst to him, he was under police surveillance and is immedi-
ately apprehended by police. The captured terrorist leader refuses to
answer any questions from the police, declaring that the passengers
must and will die shortly. If the terrorist provides details regarding
which plane the bomb is on and exactly where on the plane it is lo-
cated this will give the crew an opportunity to disarm the bomb. In
this scenario, we asserted that the morally correct course of action is
to torture the suspect. 5
We condone torture only in the lifesaving circumstances illus-
trated above. To our knowledge, no incidents of torture that have
been committed would fall within our criteria. As is discussed below,
torture has been used effectively on many occasions to thwart attacks
against civilians, but it is not clear that there were not other means
available to prevent these attacks. Thus, our proposal would not legiti-
mize, albeit retrospectively, any reported instance of torture that has
occurred. It is important to spell this out early in our response be-
cause much ink has been wasted by the critics discussing reported in-
stances of torture, implying that in some way we countenance such
conduct.
There have been four main lines of attack by the critics. The first
is a slippery slope or thin edge of the wedge argument.6 If torture is
condoned in the circumstances we set out, it will, so the argument
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See sources cited infra note 18.
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goes, result in the widespread use of torture.7 Secondly, and related to
the first point, is the argument that legalizing torture will dehumanize
society.8 Third, a more pragmatic objection to our proposal is that
torture does not work. This line of criticism purports that suspects
that are tortured supposedly will not "fess up," or that they may not
know the relevant information.9 The fourth point made by some crit-
ics is that legalization of torture would be "anti-democratic."10
Our responses are relatively short. Our task has been attenuated
by the fact that the critics have not attempted to undermine the un-
derlying consequentialist ethic upon which our proposal is based."
Rather they have taken issue with the outcome to which the applica-
tion of the utilitarian ethic commits us and have doubted whether a
proper consideration of all the relevant variables leads us to condon-
ing torture in any circumstances. There has been no attempt by the
critics to develop an alternative normative theory that justifies their
stance on torture and that can be invoked to provide answers across a
range of moral issues.
There is one qualification to the statement that the critics have
not sought to undermine the moral ethic we endorse. Many critics
have stated that our proposal is flawed because "the ends do notjustify
the means."' 2 This is more akin to a throw-away-line than a developed
and measured criticism. But regardless of how one chooses to charac-
terize the criticism, it has been said often and loudly enough to merit
a response.
This Article addresses two other central matters. The first is what
we consider the most powerful objection to our proposal: that rights
do not clash in the situations where we believe lifesaving torture is
permissible because if innocent people are killed by others we bear no
responsibility for this.1 3 We believe that this argument is flawed but
think it gets to the heart of the issue and offers the best explanation as
to why the torture debate has been so divisive.
An explanation is fitting because it is rare for a proposed legal
reform to generate so much outrage. The critics of our proposal are
7. See sources cited infra note 18.
8. See sources cited infra note 29.
9. See sources cited infra note 29.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. Consequentialism is the view that in evaluating the moral status of an act the main
consideration is the consequences that it produces. See generally Bagaric & Clarke, supra
note 1.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
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obviously well intentioned, and their responses are driven by an un-
derstandable revulsion towards the prospect of torturing a person. We
too find torture abhorrent, but less so than allowing innocent people
to be murdered. If we are all so appalled by the prospect of deliber-
ately inflicting pain and accept that it is an important moral maxim,
how can it be that such vastly different conclusions are reached re-
garding the moral status of torture? This conflict is addressed in Part
IV of this Article.
The second matter, discussed in Part V, is an explanation of why
torture matters, far beyond the contours of the discussion at hand.
The circumstances in which lifesaving torture are justifiable will occur
infrequently-perhaps never. Nevertheless, the debate is important
because it has implications well beyond the narrow practice of torture.
The supposed absolute ban on torture highlights much about what is
wrong with contemporary moral thinking. The critics are committed
to the indefensible conclusion that the right to physical integrity of
the suspect is more important than the right to life of the potential
victims and seem resolute in their convictions not to extend their
sphere of moral concern beyond the interests of the suspect to other
affected parties, namely the victims. An analysis of this type can only
occur in the context of a moral fog, which is where contemporary
moral thought finds itself.
It is in the context of such an environment that moral issues are
often resolved-not on the basis of clear thinking and reasoned analy-
sis, but according to who makes the loudest emotive retort. To this
end, we undertake a meta-analysis of the debate at hand and the way it
has played out. The emotion that this debate has generated under-
scores the view that moral debates, at least in part, often turn into
emotion venting episodes.
Before elaborating on these matters we summarize our responses
to the main criticisms that have been leveled at us.
I. Summary of Our Responses
The slippery slope argument, though probably the most common
criticism of our proposal, is the easiest to rebut. Sometimes there are
no slippery slopes or wedges with thin parts to be found-not even a
trickle behind the floodgates. Such is the case with our proposal to
legalize lifesaving torture. There is no evidence to suggest that an in-
stitutionalized practice of inflicting pain on one person to save an-
other or for the common good will lead to abuses. Capital
punishment and kidney and bone marrow transplants illustrate this.
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Torture for compassionate reasons is no more an act of brutality than
surgery to transplant a kidney from one person to save another per-
son. That is the path we are going down, not brutalizing people out of
hatred.
We condone torture in only one circumstance: as a means to save
innocent lives. We condone it only for one reason: compassion. This is
central to human flourishing and, as we shall see below in the context
of the analogy with live organ transplants, is at the core of practices
where the interests of one agent are sacrificed for those of another. A
framework based on these criteria has little prospect of being ex-
tended to encompass malevolent practices. The slippery slope argu-
ment is a distraction in the context of our proposal. Slippery slopes,
thin-ended wedges, and icebergs with small tips cannot be plucked
out of thin air to fill logical deficiencies in one's argument. They have
to be verified and proven.
The slippery slope argument in the context of this debate is an
illustration of intellectual sloppiness or expedience. The analysis is
sloppy because the critics have failed to discern the salient aspects of
the torture-to-save-lives proposal and thereby misrepresented where it
might lead us.
The slippery slope argument is an expedience in this debate by
some critics as a basis to avoid considering the actual proposal at hand
(torture to save lives), and instead is used as a launching pad to em-
bark on a non-responsive dissertation about practices that have little
connection with the proposal. Torture for lifesaving purposes is far
removed from any of the instances of the barbaric, punitive forms of
torture mentioned by the critics. Yes, we all hate the thought of tor-
ture, but torture as it has been practiced throughout history has at
best a remote connection with our proposal.
The dehumanizing criticism is misguided to the point of being
contradictory. If standing idly by allowing innocent people to be killed
does not dehumanize society, inflicting physical persuasion on a sus-
pect logically cannot either. Moreover, all nations permit individuals
and security officials to inflict far higher levels of harm, such as killing
in self-defense, than torture. 14 If we are not dehumanized now, prac-
ticing torture will not make any difference.
There is no relevant evidence that torture cannot work in the cir-
cumstances we outline. The "evidence" to the contrary that is prof-
14. See Alasdair Palmer, Is Torture Always Wrong?, SPECTATOR, Sept. 24, 2005, at 40 (not-
ing that the ban on torture is inconsistent with the acceptance of a shoot-to-kill policy in
some circumstances).
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fered by the critics has been overstated in terms of its relevance to our
proposal. The empirical data cited by the critics regarding the out-
come of other incidents of torture can be dismissed on the basis that
these incidents occurred in different settings than the one we pro-
pose. Reported incidents of torture are invariably crude acts of vio-
lence done for reasons of punishment, domination, and humiliation
in circumstances where there is little basis for believing that the victim
has relevant information. This is qualitatively different than inflicting
physical persuasion in a clinical setting where the suspect is known to
have the relevant information. Having said that, even in relation to
the crude forms of torture that have been practiced, the evidence
shows that torture has been effective to save many lives. 15
A related criticism posits that we should never torture because we
can never be sure that the suspect has the relevant information. This
is simply wrong. We can be sure of this, at least to the same degree of
certainty as is required before we take other decisive steps, such as
acting in self-defense, imprisoning or executing prisoners, or going to
war against other countries. Like all decisions, we must base our
choices on the best evidence available at the time. A requirement of
perfect knowledge as a precondition to action would freeze all human
activity-we would not even go to work in the morning because we
could never be sure that we would not be hit by the next bus. There is
no logical basis for demanding perfect knowledge only in proposed
cases of torture. This shows this argument to be a furphy.16
The anti-democratic criticism is factually wrong. The history of
humankind shows that when societies are threatened they prioritize
the common good over individual interests. 17 The critics have not
proffered a single counter-example to our claim.
The "ends do not justify the means" criticism works against critics
far more than it does our proposal. The critics presumably have some
ends in mind as well. At least we have declared what we believe the
ultimate ends to be-net human flourishing, where each person's in-
terests counts equally. If the ends (measured in human flourishing)
do not justify the means, what then does? At best the critics' ends
seem to be that torture should be banned absolutely. This, however, is
not a principle. It is a narrow rule applyied to a specific moral di-
lemma. Presumably it is derived from the pursuit of a wider objective.
Until this wider objective is revealed there is no basis for believing that
15. See discussion infra Part II.C.
16. Furphy is Australian slang for a rumor, or an erroneous or improbable story.
17. See Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 605-11 (Part II.B).
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the conclusions reached by some of the critics are other than pre-
reflective visceral responses to our proposal. It is far better to have a
stated, albeit contentious, end than none at all. Otherwise, uncer-
tainty will continue to be the one constant of our collective moral
sentiments.
We now consider these arguments in greater detail.
II. Responses to the Main Criticisms
A. Slippery Slopes Need to Be Proven, Not Imagined
The slippery slope or the dangerous precedent argument (also
often run under the banners of "thin end of the wedge," "the tip of
the iceberg," or the "floodgates" argument) has loomed large in this
debate. The critics argue that if our proposal for limited torture is
accepted, it will lead to the greater use of torture-extending well be-
yond the narrow parameters of lifesaving torture. 8
The slippery slope criticism is a distraction in this debate. It de-
flects attention from practices that would take place under our actual
proposal and diverts readers to profoundly immoral forms of torture.
There is no demonstrated connection between the two practices other
than the inventive imagination of the critics.
A proposed social or legal reform cannot be rejected merely by
stating that it might lead to bad outcomes because it might lead to simi-
lar undesirable practices. If this were the case, even unquestionably
desirable practices would be thwarted. For example, the suggestion
that we should donate more to the developing world to feed the
13,000 children that starve daily19 could be rebutted by retort that it
might lead the starving world down the slippery slope of relying on
handouts (instead of being self-sufficient). Slopes, wedges, icebergs,
and floods cannot be plucked out on a whim. They need to be con-
structed or at least verified.
18. E.g., Anne O'Rourke, Vivek Chaudhri & Chris Nyland, Torture, Slippery Slopes, Intel-
lectual Apologists, and Ticking Bombs: An Australian Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L.
REv. 85 (2005); Philip N.S. Rumney, Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects Effective? A
Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 479 (2006); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 201, 265-68 (2004).
19. A recent United Nations report notes that present levels of hunger cause the
death of more than five million children a year. In terms of more comprehensible figures,
this equates to more than 13,000 daily deaths from hunger. Road Map Towards the Implemen-
tation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., at 19, U.N. Doc.
A/56/326 (2001).
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This is not to say that the slippery slope argument is always a fal-
lacy. The slippery slope argument has been criticized on the basis that
it logically prevents change and advancement. It has been suggested
that it amounts to the proposition that:
you should not now do an admittedly right action for fear
you . . . should not have the courage to do right in some future
case, which, ex hypothesi, is essentially different, but superficially re-
sembles the present one. Every public action which is not custom-
ary, either is wrong, or, if it is right, is a dangerous precedent. It
follows that nothing should ever be done for the first time.20
We do not accept this. The suggestion fails to recognize the real
force behind the slippery slope argument, which lies in our propensity
to justify "progress" by analogizing from one situation to another, and
our fallibility in discerning the relevant and significant factors about
the practices we are comparing. There are in fact two versions of the
slippery slope argument: the logical and empirical.
The logical form of the argument is the view that clear bounda-
ries cannot be drawn around the practice under consideration. In the
context of lifesaving torture, this form of the argument is unconvinc-
ing. The reasons advanced in favor of lifesaving torture, namely the
compassionate desire to save innocent life, are clear and pointed con-
siderations. So clear that none of the known incidences of torture that
have ever been committed throughout the history of humankind de-
monstrably fit within the criteria set out above. A bright line can be
drawn between using torture as a last resort to save innocent lives, and
using torture as an act of suppression, domination, or cruelty.
The empirical version of the slippery slope argument provides
that if torture is condoned in any circumstances, it will as a matter of
fact lead to a greater preparedness to use it in other circumstances
where it is not justifiable. This argument is also flawed.
First, as noted in our original article, torture is already widely
practiced-despite the absolute legal prohibition against it.21 Amnesty
International has documented reports of torture and ill-treatment
from 132 countries, including the United States, Canada, and
France.2 2 Given the widespread use of torture, it is most unlikely that
legalizing the practice in a very narrow context would increase its
incidence.
20. F. M. CORNFORD, MIcRocosMoGRAPHIA ACADEMICA 23 (1908).
21. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 588.
22. Id. at 590.
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Second, we elaborate on the point in our first article that there is
no evidence that lifesaving torture will lead to the violation of other
rights where the pre-conditions for the practice are clearly deline-
ated.23 Empirically based slippery slope arguments only obtain some
traction where there is evidence that a practice similar to that being
proposed has expanded beyond its intended scope of application af-
ter the practice was sanctioned. In order for the empirical version of
the slippery argument to be plausible, it is necessary to point to a situ-
ation where condoning the lifesaving torture has yielded widespread
abuses. We accept that this is obviously too high a standard in the case
at hand, given that torture has never been legalized in the circum-
stances that we propose. The very least that can be expected in such
cases is a close analogy, whereby a state sanctioned practice that was
founded on a desire to save innocent lives has resulted in large scale
abuses. There are no such analogies. In fact the closest analogies to
our proposal lead to the opposite conclusion.
The salient features of our proposal are (1) the motivation for
the practice is compassion; (2) it involves sacrificing a lower interest of
one person to confer a greater benefit on another; (3) it is almost
certain that the suspect has the relevant information; and (4) consent
must be obtained by a state official (preferably a judge) before the
activity can proceed.
While there are no institutionalized practices that have these pre-
cise four elements, there are some practices that come very close, and
none of them have resulted in widespread abuses. The closest parallel
is live donor organ transplants. Elements (1) and (2) are identical; the
analogy with element (3) is obvious given that in most cases we are
almost certain that the organ will be a match, and in relation to (4), in
the place of a judge is a doctor.
Advances in medicine now make it possible to successfully per-
form procedures such as kidney and bone narrow transplants. These
cause considerable pain to the donors, but confer a great benefit to
the recipients. Less pain is caused by donating blood, but the underly-
ing rationale is the same-hurting one person to benefit another. The
practice of live donor transplants has not resulted in large scale abuse.
In countries where there is a relatively high level of law and order,
people are not plucked from the streets to have their organs plun-
dered. Of course, the difference between this and our torture propo-
sal is that the organ transfer process is consensual. This is not a
23. Id. at 614-16.
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relevant difference because non-consensual practices based on the
same rationales have not led to abuses.
To this end, a clear example is the process of criminal punish-
ment. All nations imprison people that are regarded as being a risk to
other members of the community. 24 Some nations even kill their
worst offenders. This institutionalized system of harm infliction has
not resulted in widespread abuses regarding the use of detention or
state sanctioned execution.
Even laws that permit citizens to use self-help measures to inflict
serious, and even lethal, harm such as self-defense and necessity, have
not resulted in significant abuses. This is despite the fact that such
laws are generally "grey" in application, and the lawfulness of the con-
duct is generally evaluated after that fact.
The trend flows only one way. Compassion-based laws that involve
direct harm to one person for the benefit of another person or the
wider community do not lead to widespread abuses. There is no rea-
son to believe that the situation would be any different in relation to
our proposal.
This is not to say that the empirical version of the slippery slope
argument is always without foundation. In fact one us (Bagaric) has
relied on it heavily in the context of the voluntary euthanasia debate
to argue that the practice should not be legalized in Western coun-
tries because it is likely to lead to abuses in the form of non-voluntary
euthanasia. 25 This argument is based on wide-ranging data from the
Netherlands, which showed that in a climate where voluntary euthana-
sia is permitted, a large number of incidents of involuntary euthanasia
occur. 26 The important aspect of this line of reasoning is that the slip-
pery slope argument was not invented, rather it was empirically
grounded. 27 Of course there is room to argue against the validity of a
slippery slope argument in the euthanasia context. For example, it
could be suggested that despite the apparent similarity between the
Netherlands and many other Western nations there are in fact subtle
unique social and cultural dynamics in the Netherlands. Nevertheless,
in the case of euthanasia a foundation for the slippery slope argument
24. While some theorists believe that this has a retributive rationale, in our view the
key justification for sentencing is utilitarianism. See MiRKo BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SEN-
TENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH 41-44 (2001).
25. KUMAR aAmARASEKAR & MiRKo BAGARIC, EUTHANASIA, MORALrrY AND THE LAW 63-71
(2002).
26. Id.
27. Conclusions drawn regarding euthanasia cannot be applied to the torture setting
since euthanasia does not involve balancing one person's interests against another.
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was laid. This is not so in the case of the torture debate-here the
critics have not passed the creative thinking stage.
So why is it that compassion-motivated practices that involve set-
ting off the interests of one individual against those of another or the
common good do not result in widespread abuses? There is no clear
reason for this. We speculate that it is because most people seem to
have a genuine dislike towards the concept of harming others and,
rightly, give less weight to speculative benefits than certain harms. We
are never quite sure that the bone marrow transplant will work or that
capital punishment or imprisonment are effective, but we are sure
that they cause hardship to the donor and the wrongdoer. Thus, we
tread warily when it comes to engaging in such practices. Rather than
building slippery slopes we erect increasingly high barriers to such
practices. Such is likely to be the case with lifesaving torture.
The critics have catalogued past episodes of torture at great
length. They missed one elementary point-none of the abuses in
places such as Guantanamo Bay, Algiers, Northern Ireland, Iraq (by
Iraqi and United States forces), Greece, Israel,28 and any of the more
than 100 other locations where torture has occurred were caused by a
slide down the slippery slope from lifesaving torture to torture for rea-
sons of punishment and domination. These incidences of torture gen-
erally occurred against the backdrop of widespread hatred and anger
in war or war-like situations where there was a suspension of even the
most fundamental moral standards. Torture did not cause this, it was
a symptom of the intense hatred that occurred when groups started
killing each other for reasons such as race, land disputes, and relig-
ious differences. Alternatively, the incidents of torture cited by the
critics relate to clandestine activities by misguided security officials
"fishing" for information-the dissimilarity with our proposal is
evident.
Thus, in the context of the torture debate, the only evidence of
the slippery slope argument is that many of the critics have lost their
28. The Israeli experience comes closest to our proposal, but there are enormous
differences. The criteria for torture was extremely broad: "[Sit long as the interrogator
reasonably believes the lesser evil of force is necessary to get information that would pre-
vent the greater evil of loss of innocent lives." John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating
Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 743, 757 (2002). Note
there is no requirement that torture is used as a last resort and that it is almost certain that
the suspect has the relevant knowledge. The torture guidelines were not law, but internal
police guidelines, and there was no meaningful overview of practices. See id. at 757-58. It
could only be in such a climate that eighty-five percent of Palestinian detainees were re-
ported to have been tortured. B'TSELEM, ROUTINE TORTURE: INTERROGATION METHODS OF
THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE 5 (1998).
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intellectual balance and slid down the slope of placing undue reliance
on the slippery slope argument.
B. Livesaving Torture Is a Humane Practice
The argument that condoning torture in any circumstance will
brutalize or dehumanize 29 the torturer or society in general is flawed
because it takes an unduly narrow perspective of the proposal at hand
and mischaracterizes the motivation for the proposal.
It should be noted that this criticism is sometimes put as a stand
alone argument, while on other occasions it is a premise of the slip-
pery slope argument, along the lines that any torture will result in
more torture because it will desensitize people to the suffering of
others.
We agree that inflicting pain on people is undesirable. In our
view the reduction of pain should be one of the highest-order moral
imperatives. But there is no basis for ranking one person's pain above
that of another. When we are confronted with a situation where we
must choose between who will bear unavoidable pain, we need to take
a pain minimization approach. To this end, there is no question that
causing even intense physical pain to a suspect results in less pain than
allowing many people to be killed. The ensuing pain that would be
felt by the relatives of the victims grossly outweighs the physical pain
inflicted on the suspect.
In assessing the potential dehumanizing aspect of a proposal,
there is no logical or moral basis for focusing only on the interests of
one agent in the dilemma. All affected parties must be given equal
consideration. Sure speculative consequences (in this case the likeli-
hood that the attack will be actually averted) weigh less than certain
consequences (the pain inflicted on the suspect), but at some point
the speculative side of the scales (where, for example, there are a
large number of lives at stake) are so heavy that they outweigh certain
negative consequences.
The critics fail to extend their moral horizons beyond the inter-
ests of the suspect. This individualistic account of morality represents
a far greater threat to our humanity than torturing suspects to save
lives. A society that stood by and refused to take all reasonable steps to
save innocent life would be vastly different than the one in which we
currently live. Rescuers would not be permitted to push aside bystand-
29. This is a point made by several critics. E.g., John Kleinig, Ticking Bombs and Torture
Warrants, 10 DEAKIN L. REv. 614, 620 (2005).
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ers for fear of bruising them, ambulances would not rush to save sick
people for fear of colliding into other cars, police would not pursue
criminals for the same reason, people would not undergo security
checks at airports before they got onto planes because it would inter-
fere with their right to liberty and privacy, and we would be content
with stating what a pity it was that many innocent people were mur-
dered in a possibly preventable incident on the basis that we did not
want to subject a suspect to physical persuasion. This is approaching
moral nihilism.
A related objection that has been raised to lifesaving torture is
that it will dehumanize the torturer, as opposed to society in gen-
eral.30 The evidence, however, is to the contrary. Throughout history
people have inflicted pain on individuals and sustained no demonstra-
ble moral bruises. Currently, surgeons do it as part of their daily prac-
tice. While in many countries anesthetics remove the pain during
surgery, some forms of surgery cause significant pain and discomfort
during the recuperation phase. Moreover, prior to the discovery of
anesthetics, surgeons would perform procedures that caused almost
unthinkable levels of pain, such as limb amputations. Nowadays
prison guards lock up prisoners in small cells, some parents still strike
their children, and some people kill in self-defense. Yet, there is no
evidence that such people typically suffer undue levels of trauma.
Some critics give examples of torturers who have regretted their
actions once they have come to learn that their cause was unjust.31
This is irrelevant to our proposal. We leave no scope for issues of
moral subjectivism or relativism or for changed perceptions regarding
the justness of torture. Killing innocent people is undesirable-nearly
always so-irrespective of which ideological or normative position one
happens to adopt at any point in time. Proportionate actions taken to
prevent this are objectively morally sound,32 and hence there is no
rational scope for regret about such matters.
C. Torture Is Effective-At Least Sometimes
The argument that we should not use torture in any circum-
stances because suspects will not provide the relevant information po-
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Nyland, supra note 18, at 92-97 (Part H.); see also
Sarahj Jopesh & Marius Smith, Defending the Indefensible: Torture Is Inhuman, Illegal and Futile,
AGE (Melbourne), May 18, 2005.
32. See Mirko Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument: Laying the Foundation for a Coherent System
of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REv. 163 (2002) (arguing that morality is an objective inquiry).
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tentially invalidates our proposal. Certainly, if this objection was valid
we would change our mind and not countenance torture in any cir-
cumstances. However, this argument is defective because it does not
challenge the principles of our proposal. Rather, it demonstrates a
supposed practical flaw identified with lifesaving torture. Presumably,
if this obstacle was overcome the critics would then agree with the
proposal.
The ineffectiveness of torture criticism has been advanced by
many critics. The most persuasive article on the issue was written by
Philip N.S. Rumney.3 3 The article is well-measured in its analysis and
well-researched in its scope. Rumney concludes that torture suspects
often do not divulge the information that is sought from them and
that torture is not necessarily an excellent information gathering
device.3 4
There are, however, two fundamental flaws in his article in the
context of the discussion at hand. None of the instances of torture
that Rumney considers are similar to the circumstances in which we
advocate torture should occur or to the limited means in which it
should be administered. Nearly all of the torture cases discussed by
the critics involve torture for reasons of punishment or domination
and humiliation where there is little evidence to suggest that the vic-
tims actually possess the relevant information. Moreover, the pain was
inflicted in a crude manner, rather than in a clinical institutional set-
ting, where the means used are designed to cause the minimum pain
necessary while having the least possible long-term effects. Secondly,
the wide-ranging examples Rumney refers to are no more than anec-
dotal accounts-as set out below, it is easy to give as many contrary
examples.
Concededly, torture often did not work because the victim did
not actually have the relevant information and, as a result, was forced
to lie. Other times it would not have had the desired outcome because
unsophisticated pain inducing means were invoked. This is not what is
being countenanced by our proposal. Fishing expeditions are not per-
mitted-it must be virtually certain that the suspect has the
information.
Despite the crude nature of previous incidents of torture
(thereby making accurate information virtually impossible to obtain),
there is no question that sometimes torture can be effective at elicit-
33. Rumney, supra note 18.
34. Id.
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ing information, and it can save innocent lives. 35 This is a point ac-
cepted by most of the critics.3 6 For example, Israeli authorities claim
to have foiled ninety terrorist attacks by using coercive interroga-
tion.37 It is also claimed that information provided as a result of tor-
ture enabled the French to foil terrorist attacks in the Algiers.38 One
of the people doing the torturing in the Algiers was General Paul Aus-
saresses. In his book he cites "a string of instances in which he was
able to find bombs and break up terrorist cells as a result of torture.
He claims that he quickly discovered that 'the best way to make a ter-
rorist talk when he refused to say what he knew was to torture him."' 39
An aide to United States President George W. Bush recently
noted that "torture light" is an essential tool:
"We're talking about the most successful intelligence gained in the
war on terror coming from these programs," he says. Details are
hard to come by, but Sen. Kit Bond, a member of the Senate intel-
ligence committee, [said] . . . that "enhanced interrogation tech-
niques" worked with at least one high-level Qaeda operative, 9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, to thwart a plot. Bond
would not say which one, but among foiled plots vaguely described
by the White House and linked to "KSM" was a scheme to attack
targets on the West Coast of the United States with hijacked air-
lines. The planning for such a "second wave" attack may have been
in the early stages. 40
Further, a United States investigator, Chris Mackey, who went to
Afghanistan to question al-Qaeda suspects following the United States
invasion in 2001 has commented that effective interrogation is not
possible without the use of torture. 41 According to Mackey, under the
international definition of torture, any effective form of interrogation
is perceived as torture and thus prohibited.42
35. Even O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Nyland, supra note 18, at 88-89, concede this.
36. Id.; see also Strauss, supra note 18, at 264.
37. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal? 13 (Univ.
of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 84, 2005).
38. Sanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture: An Introduction, in TORTURE: A COLLEC-
TION 23, 34 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (quoting Adam Shatz, The Torture of Algiers, N.Y.
REv. oF BooKs, Nov. 21, 2002, at 57).
39. Palmer, supra note 14, at 40-41 (citing PAUL AUSSARESSES, THE BATTLE OF THE
CASBAH: TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM IN ALGERIA, 1955-1957 (Robert L. Miller
trans., Enigma Books 1st English ed., 2002)).
40. Evan Thomas & Michelle Hirsch, The Debate over Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005,
at 27, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10020629/site/newsweek.
41. CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET WAR
AGAINST AL-QA'EDA (2004), cited in Palmer, supra note 14, at 41.
42. MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 41, cited in Palmer, supra note 14, at 41.
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Alasdair Palmer also notes that, in 1995, the Philippines intelli-
gence service provided information obtained through torture to
America that helped foil an al-Qaeda plan to crash eleven airplanes
carrying 4000 people into the ocean and to crash a small aircraft filled
with explosives into Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") headquar-
ters.43 Marcy Strauss gives the example of famous terrorist Abu Nidel
who was "broken" by Jordanian officials, and the 1993 World Trade
Center bombings that were cracked by the Philippines when they
threatened to torture a suspect.44
Much has been made by the critics of CIA manuals (the Kubark
Counterintelligence Manual and the Human Resource Exploitation
Manual) that, in parts, indicate that torture is often ineffective. 45 It is
foolhardy, however, to believe that these documents, which are dated
1963 and 1983 respectively, encompass the sum experiences or collec-
tive attitudes of even the CIA towards torture.
If the considered view of the CIA was that torture was not effec-
tive in most cases, it seems incredulous that President Bush and Vice
President Cheney would have so vigorously lobbied Congress to ex-
empt the CIA from legislation (sponsored byJohn McCain) that bans
"cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners in the deten-
tion of the US Government" and allows the CIA to torture suspects
where it is necessary to prevent a terrorist attack.
46
President Bush initially refused to endorse the proposal, stating
that he hoped to reach agreement with McCain in relation to the mat-
ter. The agreement being sought related to a proposed narrower defi-
nition of torture, which would probably allow some form of harm to
be inflicted on wrongdoers. 47 Ultimately, the Bush Administration
buckled under congressional pressure that repeated prisoner-abuse
scandals were proving to be too damaging to America's international
reputation. However, this was not until some important concessions
were introduced into the legislation, including a defense for people
43. Palmer, supra note 14, at 40. He goes on to give numerous other examples of
where torture has been effective to obtain information and thwart attacks on innocent
people.
44. Strauss, supra note 18, at 263 n.212 (citing Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About
Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 48).
45. See, e.g., Rumney, supra note 18, at 13-18.
46. David Espo & Liz Sidoti, Cheney Bid for Torture Ban Exemption, AGE (Melbourne),
Nov. 6, 2005, at 9.
47. David Sanger, Bush Confident of Deal in Tough Questions, AGE (Melbourne), Dec. 14,
2005, at 17.
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who violated the prohibition in circumstances where they believed
they were following a legal order. 48
After the bill was passed Senator John McCain conceded that it
might not apply in the extremely rare case of a suspect who knew of
an imminent attack. In the bill, torture and cruel, inhumane treat-
ment is defined as that which "shocks the conscience." 49 McCain
stated that torture in the ticking time situation, "would not shock the
conscience. And in that million-to-one situation, then the President of
the United States would authorize it and take responsibility for it." 5 °
During this debate, a former top adviser to President Bush in
Iraq, Robert Blackwill, who was national security adviser during Bush's
first term, said that torture should never be totally ruled out. He
stated:
Of course torture should not be widespread and of course
there should be extraordinarily stringent top-down requirements
in this respect. But never? ... I wouldn't say never.
[Blackwill, answering questions from the audience, said that
when he taught a class for executives at Harvard University's John
F. Kennedy School of Government, the case which caused the most
"confusion" involved a fictional detainee whose organization was
threatening to detonate a nuclear weapon in New York City.]
You have reason to believe he knows where it is. Do you tor-
ture him? ... It does seem to me that circumstances matter here
and ... I'm not an absolutist in this regard.51
Thus, torture is effective sometimes-possibly often. The critics'
examples of failed torture can be rebutted by giving at least an equal
number of examples where it has been effective and further rebutted
by the realization that the torture events referred to were often puni-
tive fishing expedition-certainly there is no evidence to suggest that
the torturers were overly concerned with ensuring that the suspect
had the requisite information before they commenced the torture.
The underlying problem with the way this aspect of the debate
has developed is that it is in danger of degenerating into a distracting
and superficial numbers game-with the winner supposedly being the
side that can provide the most number of examples to support their
contention. As is discussed below, the above examples of effective tor-
48. See generally Tim Reid, Bush Forced to Accept Torture Ban, TIMES (London), Dec. 16,
2005.
49. Torture Ban Has Exceptions, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), Dec. 20, 2005, available at
http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story-page/0,5478,17609059%255EI 702,
00.html.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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ture are not catalogued to claim victory on this issue, but rather to
illustrate how easily the numbers game can be played.
Before moving to more sagacious matters, we underline the futil-
ity of the numbers process engaged in by some of the critics. This is a
device that has not been confined to the ultimate effectiveness of tor-
ture. Some critics have also gone to lengths to discuss the reasons why
torture is supposedly unlikely to work.52 This has even been in rela-
tion to issues where the numbers avalanche is against them.
Some critics have argued that our proposal is unsound because of
the difficulties involved in identifying persons who have the relevant
knowledge.53 To buttress their argument they give examples of errors
made by police and security officials in making false arrests. 54 The
fallacy in this argument is that it attempts to extrapolate the exception
into the rule. For every false arrest it would be possible, literally, to
give hundreds and perhaps thousands of examples of the right person
being detained or questioned. Often there is little doubt that a person
is involved in a criminal activity. Sometimes they make admissions;
other times they are caught from surveillance cameras before the at-
tack (as were the London bombers onJuly 7, 2005-although the tape
was not noticed until after the bombs went off). The fact that mistakes
regarding identity are sometimes made is no more of an argument
against our proposal than it is for closing the entire criminal justice
system given the number of innocent people that are falsely
imprisoned.
Given the clandestine nature of torture and the almost total
dearth of reliable data kept on such events, it is verging on intellectual
dishonesty to purport to provide an overarching account or precise
summary of the extent to which torture victims fess up.5 5 The only
salient points to be drawn about the effectiveness of torture are (1)
that we know as a fact that humans dislike pain and will try to avoid it,
and (2) all the information from past instances of torture reveals only
the following: sometimes it has resulted in suspects divulging informa-
tion to security officials who have used the information to save other
people; sometimes it has not been effective.
It is not easy to find situations where torturers take at least some
steps to ensure that the suspect has the relevant knowledge and tor-
ture is not at least partially motivated by an institutionalized dislike of
52. E.g., Rumney, supra note 18, at 506-09.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 263.
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the victim, as is normally the case in wartime situations. Yet, it is possi-
ble to obtain some useful data regarding the effectiveness of torture.
In this regard we need to look to more mundane incidents of
torture, as opposed to torture in war-like settings, which is often moti-
vated by intense hatred towards the victim (as opposed to a genuine
desire to obtain information-especially information that is known to
be in the possession of the victim) and in circumstances where the
rule of law is often suspended.
The closest analogy that can be made to our proposal relates to
garden variety police investigations. Police normally do not have a
strong desire to punish any particular sections of the community and
take some steps to ensure that they only arrest people where there is
evidence of involvement in the crime in question. Sometimes police
break the law and assault suspects in a bid to ascertain the truth.
Given that they do not normally have a preexisting dislike of the sus-
pect, their techniques are presumably motivated at least largely by rea-
sons of information gathering so that the crime can be solved. The
ultimate motivation, one assumes, is to enhance community safety, as
opposed to a desire to humiliate or punish the suspect.
Courts have highlighted a number of instances where the will of
suspects has been overborne as a result of police beatings, threats, and
other acts of thuggery. We are not talking about contrived confessions
to stop the beatings and the like, but reliable confessions made to stop
the pain.56
And if suspects are willing to betray themselves by confessing to
crimes that will result in their long term incarceration, it follows that
they will betray their cause and provide information that will save in-
nocent lives.
Thus, the argument that torture never works is unsupportable.
Rather, the most accurate assessment of the efficacy of torture as an
information gathering device is that it will sometimes fail, while on
other occasions it will succeed. We agree with Rumney that the issue
of effectiveness is central in this debate.57 The way forward here is to
obtain more pointed data regarding the circumstances in which tor-
56. See generally Strauss, supra note 18 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(sheriff obtained confessions from three black suspects by whipping them until they made
confessions); Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (police physically
abused a kidnapper by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until he revealed
the location where the victim (whose life police feared was in imminent danger) was being
held; police then rescued the victim); see also CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 401 (4th ed. 2000).
57. Rumney, supra note 18, at 481.
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ture has been effective and when it has failed. The study could only be
retrospective-no one would seriously contemplate actually torturing
people for experimental purposes.
The surveyed cases should be confined to instances of torture
that as closely as possible resemble the torture framework we suggest,
i.e. where the mistreatment is not for punitive reasons, and the sus-
pect is known to have the relevant information. To this end, the only
viable respondents would consist of former and current police of-
ficers, who would need to be given absolute immunity from prosecu-
tion for the information that they disclosed.
It is important to note that the results of such a study cannot lead
to the conclusion that torture is never justifiable. If it transpires that
even the most effective torture techniques only elicit the relevant in-
formation in a small number of cases, this would mean that the plus
side of the scales would need to be heavier than first proposed for
torture to be justified. If thousands of lives were at stake, even a twenty
percent likelihood that torture would be effective would justify the use
of torture.
Ultimately, we cannot guarantee that torture will work in any
given instance, but we can be virtually certain that doing nothing will
fail when we are faced with an imminent catastrophe.
D. Torture Is Not Anti-Democratic
Another supposed downside of torture is that it is anti-democratic
or will corrupt democracy. Some critics have even said that it will have
a "devastating effect" on democracy. 58 This is a confusing argument
because its main premise is not articulated. Democracy is a complex
and ill-defined notion. If it means majoritarianism, as many believe to
be the case, then a lawfully elected government can obviously legalize
torture through its normal political process. If the normal law-making
process is observed, then lifesaving torture and democracy sit
harmoniously.
It is certainly not inconceivable that a robust and free democracy
would permit lifesaving torture. The latest Newsweek poll on the sub-
ject shows that a clear majority of Americans support torture in
roughly the circumstances we indicate.
[Forty-four] percent of the public thinks torture is often or some-
times justified as a way to obtain important information, while 51
percent say it is rarely or never justified. A clear majority-58 per-
58. O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Nyland, supra note 18, at 92.
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cent-would support torture to thwart a terrorist attack, but asked
if they would still support torture if that made it more likely ene-
mies would use it against Americans, 57 percent said no. Some 73
percent agree that America's image abroad has been hurt by the
torture allegations.59
Moreover, as we noted in our first article, when democratic societies
have their backs to the wall and are forced to make difficult choices,
they invariably go down the path of least harm.60 This harm is often
less than that involved in torturing a suspect. In the first article we
gave several examples of the preparedness of governments to sacrifice
the interests of individuals for the greater good, such as forcing
soldiers to go to war.61 The principle behind such decisions has not
been challenged by the critics. But for illustrative purposes we add to
the catalogue of situations that make it clear that when forced to
chose between two evils, we always elect for the lesser evil.
The English Court of Appeal in the case of In re A (Children)6 2 in
2000 held that it was permissible to kill one conjoined twin in order to
improve the chances that the other would live-even with no guaran-
tee that the twin would survive the operation. 63 Why did the court
make this decision? Pressed to make a choice between important con-
flicting rights, the Ward LJ resolved the matter "by choosing the lesser
of the two evils and so finding the least detrimental alternative."64
For another "real life" example of what we do in extreme cases,
refer to the Zeebrugge disaster in 1987.65 Dozens of people were in
the water and in a danger of drowning. They were near the foot of a
rope ladder, but their route to safety was blocked for at least ten min-
utes by a young man who was petrified by cold or fear (or both) and
was unable to move. The Corporal gave instructions to push him off
the ladder. He was never seen again.66 What if instead of blocking the
ladder the young man refused to provide the PIN number to release
the ladder? There is little doubt that he would have been subjected to
some "physical persuasion."
Continuing with the real life theme (to finally bury the claim that
the examples we cite belong in the realms of fiction), most countries
59. Thomas & Hirsch, supra note 40, at 29.
60. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 607.
61. Id.
62. In reA (Children) (2001) Fam. 147 (C.A.) (U.K.).
63. Mirko Bagaric, The Jodie and Marie Siamese Twins Case-The Problem with Rights, 8
J.L. & MED. 311-21 (2001).
64. A (Children) (2001) Fam., at 147.
65. Id.
66. Id.
Spring 2006] TORTURED RESPONSES
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
have laws that compel witnesses to give evidence in court. We compel
them to do so, regardless of the level of mental anguish it causes or
the level of danger that it places them in.
A recent illustration involves twenty-seven year old Melbourne
lawyer, Zarah Garde-Wilson. She was found guilty of contempt of
court for refusing to testify against two "gangsters" who had murdered
her boyfriend. 67 The murders were in the context of unprecedented
underworld killings in Melbourne, resulting in the execution-style kill-
ings of over twenty "gangland" figures over several years. During ques-
tioning by the judge about her involvement with the victim (her
former boyfriend) she wept in the witness box and responded that she
was "unable to answer questions due to fear for my safety." 68 One of
the accused threatened her and she said that she believed she would
get her "head blown off' if she gave evidence. 69 She applied to enter a
police witness protection program, but was rejected.70 Still the fact
that Ms. Garde-Wilson thought she would be killed if she gave evi-
dence and was obviously traumatized by the prospect of giving evi-
dence did not find much favor with the judge. In finding her guilty of
contempt for refusing to answer the questions, Justice Harper stated
that her fear was no excuse for not giving evidence and that if other
witnesses in murder trials also refused to testify, "no system of justice
could survive."71
Thus, we have a situation where the criminal justice system is us-
ing the threat of imprisonment to coerce information from a trauma-
tized innocent individual who has reasonable grounds for believing
that she will be killed if she obeys the law. Given a choice between this
ordeal and a dose of physical persuasion, there would no doubt be
many people that would prefer the former. As a community we often
treat individuals very harshly when the common good is at stake. It is
an undeniable fact. Yet democracy remains intact.
As a side issue, there is an absence of the arguments that are used
against our lifesaving torture proposal in the context of compelled
witness disclosure. In this context, there are no utterances along the
lines that we should not force witnesses to give evidence because we
can never be sure that the witness has the evidence, the witness might
67. R v. Garde-Wilson (2005) V.S. Ct. 441.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Stephen Moynihan, Underworld Lawyer Found Guilty of Contempt, AGE (Melbourne),
Nov. 15, 2005, at 3.
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lie, and so on. These arguments resonate very strongly with the tor-
ture critics but are muted in the context of other institutionalized
practices that can have a crushing impact on individuals. These argu-
ments are just as flawed and futile in the context of torture.
Some critics have sought to bolster the notion of democracy
slightly by arguing that it is built on the foundation of respect for indi-
viduals and human rights, and that torture runs counter to this. 72
This, in essence, is the dehumanizing point repeated under a differ-
ent banner. If democracy does entail respect for individuals and
human rights, then surely each individual counts equally in this pro-
cess, including potential victims.
Even if we move from strictly majoritarianism accounts of democ-
racy to more expansive and sophisticated accounts of the nature of
democracy, which contend that democracy is a substantive rather than
procedural concept, there seems no scope for labeling the institution-
alization of lifesaving torture as a threat to democracy. For example,
the democratic ideal adopted by Samuel Freeman provides that the
only political and social institutions that are justifiable by democratic
sovereignty are those that reflect the interests common to all people.73
It can hardly be doubted that the highest order interest shared by
most people is the right to life.
Moreover, as noted by Palmer, countries such as France, Britain,
and Israel have all used torture widely over the past fifty years and
"none have sunk into barbarism, or ceased to be a law-governed
democracy."74
If the critics want to persuasively advance the democracy argu-
ment, they need to spell out the key indicia of such a concept and how
it is incompatible with going down the path of the least evil. The crit-
ics have much work to do on this front.
III. The Real Divide: Where Responsibility Starts and Ends
Despite the apparent divide between us and the critics, there is
considerable consensus in important respects. We both approach the
issue from the perspective that it is bad to inflict pain, and we agree
that compassion should drive moral outcomes. While there is disa-
greement regarding the effectiveness of torture, this relates to a differ-
72. O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Nyland, supra note 18, at 92-93.
73. Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21
PHIL. & Pun. As. 3, 22 (1992).
74. Palmer, supra note 14, at 41.
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ence in degree, not nature (the critics do not contend that torture
never works). Additionally, we are confident that the critics would
agree that the right to life is more important that the right to physical
integrity-at least we doubt that a tenable argument could be
mounted to the contrary. Thus, the central point of difference that
remains is the application of the slippery slope argument. This does
not appear sufficient to explain the gulf between our respective views.
In our view, a large part of the reason for the difference in our
conclusions on torture relates to a notion that has not featured in the
surface nature of the debate. This is the notion of responsibility. The
fundamental divide between us and the critics is that invariably when
they present their views they focus on the brutality of torture. 75 On
the other hand, we focus on the need to save innocent lives. The crit-
ics rarely comment on the other side of their anti-torture proposal-
the cruelty associated with standing idly by as the innocent are killed.
This point is also made by Louis Seidman:
[Opponents of torture] focus on the human suffering imposed by
the use of certain techniques, but are unwilling to broaden their
concern to suffering that might be caused by the failure to use
them. Instead, many of them adopt as an article of faith the pro-
position that these techniques are never useful.76
The moral horizons of the critics, it seems, are arbitrarily trans-
fixed on the plight of the suspect. The critics need to lift their hori-
zons and consider the interests of all the parties whose interests are
likely to be affected by the decision regarding whether or not to tor-
ture the suspect. This is a glaring failure on behalf of the critics. Thus,
we are not told, for example, what response is suitable to give to the
relatives of innocent people killed in a potentially preventable mur-
derous act. A copy of the Convention Against Torture, 77 even if
framed, would surely not suffice.
This involves some speculation, but the reason that the critics do
not go there--and spell out which principle justifies not acting to save
the innocent people-we believe is because they are (indirectly) rely-
ing on what is potentially the strongest counterargument to the pro-
posal to allow lifesaving torture. 78
75. Louis M. Seidman, Torture's Truth, 72 U. CHm. L. REV. 881, 883 (2005).
76. Id.
77. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
of Punishment, at 197, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51 (Dec. 10, 1984).
78. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, also examine reasons why torture is for many
taboo. They speculate that it might be in part due to "concern for reputation, social influ-
ences, and the fear of ostracism" along with the common "herding" process where people
blindly follow the lead of others. Id. at 33.
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A criticism that is often made of utilitarianism is that it does not
give sufficient space for people to pursue their individual projects and
requires us to take too much responsibility for actions and events not
of our doing. The classic illustration of this is the famous Jim and
Pedro example by Bernard Williams. 79
Jim is a botanist on an expedition in a small South American
town where the ruthless government regards him as an honored visi-
tor from another land. He goes into town and sees twenty Indians tied
up. Pedro, the captain in charge, explains that the Indians are a ran-
dom group of inhabitants who, after recent protests against the gov-
ernment, are about to be executed to deter others from protesting.
Since Jim is an honored guest, Pedro offers him the "privilege" of kill-
ing one of the Indians himself. If he accepts, as a special mark of the
occasion, the other Indians will be spared. If he refuses, they will all be
killed. Jim realizes it is impossible to take the guns and kill Pedro and
the large number of other soldiers. The Indians and other soldiers
understand the situation, and the Indians are begging for him to take
up the offer.80
Williams argues that if Jim were a utilitarian he would kill the
Indian.81 Williams himself has trouble accepting this outcome. Wil-
liams's quarrel is not necessarily with the result that utilitarianism
commits one to (in fact he has subsequently stated that he too would
shoot the Indian), but with the reasoning process employed by the
utilitarian to resolve the dilemma. Williams contends that utilitarian-
ism cuts out considerations that most would think integral to such
cases, such as the idea that each of us is specially responsible for what
he or she does, rather than what others do. 82 This, therefore, makes
utilitarianism unintelligible because it fails to appreciate the relation-
ship between a man and his projects.
At least implicitly, anti-torture proponents seem to be endorsing
this account of personal responsibility by failing to expressly consider
the interests of the innocent people at risk. There is some merit in this
view. As individuals we cannot be expected to take responsibility and
attempt to correct all the potential injustices that we can potentially
correct. This would make life intolerable and cut us off from many of
the activities that give life meaning and purpose. People achieve hap-
79. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
96, 98 (J.J.C. Smart & B. Williams eds., 1973).
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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piness not only by making other people happy but through a vast
range of projects such as being committed to persons, causes, institu-
tions, or any other of a multitude of activities. 83
The notion of personal responsibility, however, is ultimately not
so narrow to enable societies to avoid responsibility for preventable
deaths. At the personal level, one of us (Bagaric) has argued that our
obligations are circumscribed by the maxim of positive duty. This is
the view that we must assist others in serious trouble, when assistance
would immensely help them at no or little inconvenience to
ourselves. 84
There are occasions when acting morally requires us to do more
than merely refrain from certain behavior-where we must actually do
something. Morality defined exhaustively as a set of negative proscrip-
tions fails to explain why it is morally repugnant for Bill Gates to re-
fuse to give his loose change to the starving peasant whose path he
crosses, or why it is wrong to decline to save the child drowning in a
puddle in order to avoid getting our shoes wet, or to refuse to throw a
life rope to the person drowning beside the pier. Torturing a suspect
to save other people from being killed arguably does not come within
this principle-inflicting pain on another person is no minor
inconvenience.
However, different considerations apply regarding governmental
obligations and the institutionalization of practices. Governments
have a duty to implement practices and processes that balance the
countervailing interests of all the citizenry regarding actual and fore-
seeable practices and events. Thus, governments are required to form
defense forces, police forces, courts, and hospitals. In the operation of
such institutions, each individual's interests must count equally.
Given that it is foreseeable that people will continue to engage in
activities that threaten the lives of others, it would be remiss for the
government not to develop a framework for dealing with such scena-
rios. The number of situations where such a framework may be uti-
lized will be rare, but given the enormity of issues that are relevant,
the matter cannot be ignored.
Thus, the critics have no basis for considering only one aspect of
the torture equation when they are developing their responses. If tor-
ture is never permissible, they are required to explain which account
83. Id. at 112.
84. See Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopoulos, International Human Rights Law: All Show,
No Go, 4J. HUM. RTS. 3 (2005).
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of responsibility shields them from being responsible for the deaths of
innocent people whom they refused to assist.
IV. Why the Torture Debate Really Matters (and Why a Meta
Analysis of the Torture Debate Supports Our Argument)
Hopefully, we will never find ourselves in a situation where a tor-
ture warrant may be issued. Despite the scarcity with which such situa-
tions may occur, the torture debate is important. This is because it
highlights many of the failings of current moral thinking that are re-
sponsible for an enormous amount of preventable suffering in the
world. As noted in our first article, contemporary moral discourse is
dominated by (non-consequentialist) rights-based theories.8 5
One of us (Bagaric) has previously argued that these theories are
flawed.8 6 They have no foundation and are unable to provide persua-
sive answers to central issues such as: What is the justification for
rights? How can we distinguish real from fanciful rights? And which
right takes priority in the event of conflicting rights? 8 7 As Jeremy Ben-
tham taught us two hundred years ago, rights as used in conventional
moral discourse are "nonsense on stilts. ' '88
In the end, there is no basis upon which to distinguish real from
illusory rights and no way of determining which right wins when there
is a clash of rights. Given that rights have no justification, when they
clash the winner is often the person who yells the loudest.
Despite the fact that rights are nonsense, we like rights. They ap-
peal to those of us who have a self-focused approach to moral issues.
But buried only slightly beneath such an approach are the inescapable
realities that as people we live in communities, communities are
merely the sum of a number of other individuals, and the actions of
one person exercising his or her rights can have a negative effect on
the interests of others. While rights seek to "atomize" people, the real-
ity of the human condition is that we do not and cannot function
happily without the involvement of others.8 9
85. Id.; Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 597-605 (Part II.A).
86. See generally Bagaric & Dimopoulos, supra note 84.
87. Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of Punishment: Punishing the Innocent
and the Compatibility of Utilitarianism and Rights, 24 AuSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 95, 121-43 (1999).
88. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 501 (Simpkin, Marshall & Co.
1843).
89. Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, GoodbyeJustice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming Posi-
tive Psychology to the Law, 10 DEAKIN L. REv. 1, 12 (2005).
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The two principal problems associated with endorsing a moral
code that approaches moral dilemmas through the prism of rights is
that the moral horizon is limited to oneself and those directly within
one's view, and there is no mechanism for ranking rights. This makes
it very easy for us to be preoccupied with our interests and place our
minor concerns above life and death concerns of other-especially
distant-people. Rights are a good apparatus for deflecting moral
responsibility.
As a result, human rights discourse is effective only at the conver-
sational level. The promises of grandiose international and national
rights-based-documents have bypassed a large portion of the world's
population. Many people are not even capable of reading the docu-
ments or are too hungry or too hot or too cold to summon the energy
to inquire what they contain. Thus, while the surface nature of our
language and discourse almost unquestionably accepts the existence
of human rights-and "universal" ones at that-there is a huge gap
between our acts and words when it comes to rights. 90 We are good at
talking up rights and even asserting our rights but deficient when it
comes to securing the rights of others-especially the people we are
not directly confronted with.
"Enough grain alone is produced to provide every human being
on the planet with 3500 calories a day-enough to make most people
fat... . "91 Yet more than 13,000 people are starving daily while much
of the Western world is gorging itself to ill health on super-size
meals.92 How can we let this situation occur?
A significant part of the answer rests in the fact that we operate in
a moral framework that is individualizing, has no express regard for
the common good, and provides no clear guidance regarding the in-
terests that matter most to human flourishing. One of us (Bagaric)
has previously argued that we must debunk a number of existing nor-
mative and psychological fallacies from our collective psyches in order
to eradicate the gross inequities in the world.93 This includes a belief
in baseless forms of rights.
90. See also Bagaric & Dimopoulos, supra note 84.
91. Pamela Bone, We Can Be What We Eat, AGE (Melbourne), Mar. 12, 2005, at 12. The
problem is also one of democracy. As noted by Amartya Sen, "No democratic country with
a free press has suffered a famine. Governments that can be thrown out by the people have
a vested interest in making sure the people can eat." Id.
92. See Mirko Bagaric & Sharon Erbacher, Fat and the Law: Who Should Take the Blame,
12J.L. & MED. 323 (2005).
93. Bagaric & Dimopoulous, supra note 84, at 3-21.
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The subject of torture provides an excellent illustration of much
of what is wrong with prevailing rights orthodoxy. It highlights: (1)
the horizon limiting effect of such theories. As noted above, the critics
do not address the rights of the innocent whose lives are at risk, in-
stead confining their gaze to the person immediately before them
(the suspect); (2) the absence of a mechanism for ranking rights and
the problems associated with a belief in absolute rights. Thus, we see
that the critics are committed to the untenable position that the right
to life is lower down the rights hierarchy than the right to physical
integrity; and (3) given the formless nature of contemporary rights-
based theories, the fact that moral debates are often dominated not by
reasoned arguments but emotive utterances-without any degree of
apparent coherency or impertinence-thereby stifling moral
progress.
The third point is aptly illustrated by the manner in which this
debate has been played out, particularly in the Australian context
where passion trumped clear thinking.94
This chest-thumping and disparaging approach to moral dis-
course was not confined to the utterances of lay people, who may have
understandably been jarred by the proposal to allow torture in, albeit,
limited circumstances.
Thus, we see that in the article by O'Rourke in Volume 40-1 of
this Law Review, we are referred to as "apologists" for torture-several
times, just in case the point was missed the first time. 95 This is despite
the fact that we do not condone a single incident of torture that has
occurred in the history of the world. We are no more apologists for
torture than O'Rourke is an apologist for the murder of the lives she
is unprepared to try to save. We have little doubt that this point was
not missed on her, but it is only in the context of a moral code whose
contours are so formless that this type of approach would be regarded
as being credible.
The President of an organization called Liberty Victoria (who is
thanked by O'Rourke in her paper for his helpful comments) stated
that the article in which we proposed lifesaving torture was a "stain"
94. This is not to suggest that all the critics of our proposal have fallen into the trap of
allowing emotion to win the day. As noted above the article by Rumney is excellent. Al-
though not a response to our proposal other measured and clear thinking pieces that take
a contrary approach to our proposal include: Kleinig, supra note 29; Parry & White, supra
note 28; Strauss, supra note 18.
95. O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Nyland, supra note 18, at 86.
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on the reputation of our law school.96 Apparently the concepts of free
speech and prohibition of guilt by association do not rank highly on
that organization's ideals. The Immigration Lawyers Association of
Australasia stated that our views were "offensive, unforgivable and
even barbaric. '97 Comparisons were made between one of us
(Bagaric) and Adolf Hitler 98 by a community ethnic leader. Letters
were sent to editors of this Law Review urging it not to publish the
original paper, and some law groups and even politicians called for
one of us (Bagaric) to be fired from his position as a member of the
Refugee Review Tribunal.99
This type of discourse by seemingly intelligent and well-inten-
tioned people could only occur in the context of a discipline that has
few, if any, boundaries. 100 To this end, the most telling aspect of this
debate is that none of the critics have attempted to develop an alter-
native moral framework to the consequentialist ethic that we endorse.
O'Rourke refers to our underlying theory as built upon a "feeble con-
sequentialist fabric,"'01 apparently with little regard to the fact that
utilitarianism has been the main driver of political and social develop-
ment for at least two centuries, until the past several decades.
Certainly, it is appropriate to criticize utilitarianism, but to do so
requires reasons in support of such a contention. The remark that it
must be wrong because it leads to bad outcomes was dealt with in the
previous article' 2-as a society when we find ourselves in ajam we do
(and should) follow the path of harm minimization-this is the ulti-
mate "tie breaker." To persuasively criticize our account requires the
advancement of an alternative moral theory that can provide coherent
answers across the whole spectrum of moral issues that we as individu-
als, and together as a society, face from time to time. Absent such a
theory we get randomness or, worse still, the domination of those
prone to high emotion with loud voices-the antithesis of a moral
code.
96. See Liz Minchin, Make Torture Legal Say Two Academics, AGE (Melbourne), May 17,
2005, at 1.
97. Kate Gibbs, Profession Condemns Torture Vision, LAws. WVy., May 27, 2005, at 1.
98. Daniel Fogarty, Torture Proposal Repulses Leader, GEELONG ADVERTISER, May 19,
2005, at 4.
99. Gibbs, supra note 97, at 1.
100. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 37, believe that there are other reasons for the
taboo in relation to torture. They speculate that it might be in part due to "concern for
reputation, social influences, and fear of ostracism" along with the common "herding"
process where people blindly follow the "lead" of others. Id. at 33.
101. O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Nyland, supra note 18, at 105.
102. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1, at 605.
[Vol. 40
To illustrate this point, we provide two examples of the problems
that beset theorists who do not endorse a utilitarian approach. They
come from rebuttals to our paper published in the Deakin Law Re-
view. The first is an article by John Kleinig who elegantly advances
many of the criticisms that we rebut in this Article.103 Ostensibly, many
readers will be attracted to some of his arguments, but his approach
collapses when he finally addresses the proposal at hand. At a lecture
on the subject of torture, delivered several days after our opinion
piece was published in The Age, he said that our proposal was illogi-
cal.' 0 4 "[T] he Deakin lecturers' argument-that torture in extreme
situations may be justified because the interests of many can outweigh
the suffering of a few-was inhumane and illogical." 105
"However, he then conceded that if Melbourne were under
threat of a nuclear attack, which was then averted by torturing a con-
fession from a suspect, he would be relieved."'1 6 His resolution of this
apparent contradiction: "That may be the one situation where we as a
society might say, 'You went out on a limb and did something we're
totally opposed to, but it had a good result, so we forgive you.'"107
This is the sort of confusion that occurs if moral dilemmas are
approached on the basis of piecemeal solutions without the support of
underlying theories. When non-consequentialist theories are applied
to hard cases they become unstable-often leading to unprincipled
compromises. This is because they are lacking in substance, meaning
that their proponents are reduced to relying on "fine phrases [that]
are the last resource of those who have run out of arguments."'08
This is highlighted by Desmond Manderson's contribution to the
debate. He offers an impassioned argument against torture. In the
end, his reasons for dismissing lifesaving torture are:
Torture is wrong under all circumstances, not because it leads to
certain bad outcomes, but for no reason: simply and inherently.
This is not a perverse argument. Love, for example, is good not
because it might lead us to wealth or happiness, but for no reason.
Itjust is. In fact, to look for reasons, to ask "what is love good fo' or
"how does loving someone benefit me?" is a sign of psychopathy. If
103. See generally Kleinig, supra note 29.
104. Liz Minchin, Deakin Staff Students Rally on Torture Backing, AGE (Melbourne), May
27, 2005, at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Peter Singer, All Animals Are Equal, in APPLIED ETHIcs, 215, 228 (Peter Singer ed.,
1986).
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Bagaric and Clarke and Faris cannot see the inherent wrong of
torture, it is hard to see how to communicate with them.1 09
In fact, moral discourse does require reasons-otherwise, as
noted above, yelling wins the day. The emptiness of Manderson's "rea-
soning" is highlighted by substituting "women's rights" for "torture" in
the above quote and studying the evolution of the women's movement
in the United States as recently as 150 years ago or in contemporary
Iran or Saudi Arabia. Moreover, love is not self-evidently good-hence
the reason for so many domestic killings in the name of love. In the
end, only consequences matter.
The manner in which this debate has been played out provides a
good example of the distortions in moral belief and social commen-
tary that can occur in a moral vacuum. Perhaps in the end moral judg-
ments are simply emotive retorts that are dressed up in a veneer of
objectivity in order that they can be used as argumentative levers to
attempt to shape the behavior of others. The once popular meta-ethi-
cal theory of emotivism suggested this. 110 However, in our view it is
premature to give up searching for universal moral standards. This
can only be frustrated by providing a receptive ear to emotional re-
torts, no matter how loudly or frequently they are expressed.
As illustrated by consideration of the subject of torture, the
problems with rights-based theories provide compelling reasons for
endorsing the moral theory that we advanced in our first paper: utili-
tarianism. In this context there is a clear framework for settling moral
disputes. The proposal that prevails is that which will best enhance
human flourishing, where each person's interest counts equally-
whether they are a suspect or potential victim and irrespective of
where in the world they have the fortune or misfortune of being born.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the emotion generated by
our torture paper-and why we are relatively confident that the critics
lost perspective of the wider issues at hand and were swept away by the
pejorative connotation attached to the word torture-is that if our
proposal to allow warrants to be issued in lifesaving circumstances was
adopted it would probably narrow the circumstances in which torture
is currently lawful.
The common law defense of necessity (which has at its base the
same utilitarian foundation as self-defense) has three requirements:
(1) the act (the infliction of physical pain) is needed to avoid inevita-
109. Desmond Manderson, Another Modest Proposal 10 D.AJN L. REv. 640, 651-52
(2005) (footnotes omitted).
110. See Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 1.
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ble and irreparable evil (the death of innocent people); (2) no more
should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be
achieved; and (3) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to
the evil avoided.
In the United States the defense is typically articulated in simpler
terms but has the same key features. Necessity applies where an ac-
cused reasonably believed his or her harmful actions "were necessary
to avert a greater, imminent harm."111
Now juxtapose this with the circumstances in which we suggest
that torture is permissible. Torture should be permissible where the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) when innocent lives (not other
lesser interests) are at risk; (2) there is a near certainty that the suspect
has the relevant information; and (3) the pain inflicted is the mini-
mum necessary to elicit the information and aims to have no lasting
effects.
Our proposal has the additional safeguard that torture must be
approved by ajudicial officer before it occurs, rather than leaving it to
law enforcement officers to make the judgment and then testing after
the event whether they complied with the law.
Our standard is narrower because the only threats that justify tor-
ture are to life (not lesser interests), and we require a higher level of
confidence that the suspect has the information.11 2
It is also noteworthy that while the law previously held that neces-
sity could not justify killing another person to ward off a greater
threat, this no longer seems to be the case, at least in the United King-
dom, following the decision in In re A (Children). In our home state of
Victoria, legislation was recently passed removing any doubt that, in
fact, necessity is a defense to killing. The Crimes (Homicide) Act in-
troduces a defense of "sudden or extraordinary emergency," which
exculpates killing where it is reasonable in the circumstances. a13 This
111. See Parry & White, supra note 28, at 764.
112. For an argument that necessity does not permit torture, see Paola Gaeta, May
Necessity Be Available as a Defence for Torture in the Interrogation of Suspected Terorists?, 2J. INT'L
CIuM. JUST. 785 (2004). But see Parry & White, supra note 28; O'Rourke, Chaudhri & Ny-
land, supra note 18, at 96 (citing a memo by Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel for the
Bush Administration).
113. Crimes Act 1958, § 9AI (Vict.) The new provisions state:
(1) A person is not guilty of a relevant offence in respect of conduct carried out
by him or her in response to circumstances of sudden or extraordinary
emergency.
(2) This section applies if and only if the person carrying out the conduct reason-
ably believes that-
(a) circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency exist; and
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could extend to torture. If the victim/suspect does not die, the com-
mon law of necessity will continue to apply.
It is astounding that these points were missed in the context of an
informed debate, especially by lawyers and legal academics. The ex-
planation for this is that the debate has not been informed at all. It is
a classic example of emotion trumping clear thinking. The fact that
our contemporary moral thinking is so blurred that such arguments
still have a veneer of plausibility provides a strong reason for moving
to a new moral framework.
V. Clarification of Incidental Matters
There are two points of clarification that are in order from our
first paper. First, the point about torturing innocent people has been
grossly distorted. These people have information that can save many
lives. If questioned they are morally required to provide the informa-
tion. As noted above, it would be morally wrong for them to decline to
do so, for the same reasons that it is wrong for a person to refuse to
save a baby drowning in a puddle. Also, the point about torturing to
death is exaggerated. No information can be gathered after a suspect
is dead. This point is merely a concession to the fact that, unfortu-
nately, we cannot always predict with certainty the consequence of
harming a person-the "thin skull" conundrum. Again, torture tech-
niques should aim to inflict high levels of pain that cause the mini-
mum level of long-term discomfort.
Conclusion
The torture debate highlights the failings of contemporary moral
discourse. The circumstances in which torture is morally permissible
will hopefully be rare, but they are foreseeable. If they do arise it is
important that we adopt the life-affirming approach. It is obviously
bad to inflict physical pain on suspects, but it is much worse to allow
innocent people to be murdered. This conclusion is evident from the
fact that there is no underlying theory that even purports tojustify the
view that the right to life is less important than the right to physical
integrity.
(b) committing the offence is the only reasonable way to deal with the emer-
gency; and
(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the emergency.
(3) This section only applies in the case of murder if the emergency involves a
risk of death or really serious injury.
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Critics reject the proposal that lifesaving torture is morally per-
missible principally because they do not extend their moral horizons
far enough to consider the interests of the innocent people whose
lives are at stake. This, however, is largely not their fault. Non-willful
blindness is a byproduct of the warped and largely formless moral
code that transcends much of contemporary Western thinking.
The most important lesson from the torture debate is that the
only absolute principle is that there is no absolute principle. The clos-
est we get to an ultimate moral standard is that we must act to maxi-
mize human flourishing, where each individual's interest counts
equally-even those who are not immediately before us.
While the critics have been confused, one hopes that they are not
incorrigible and that they finally take a few steps up the moral moun-
tain beyond the rights fog in which they are currently enveloped. It
would make the world a far better place.
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